





  The New Food Safety Regime in the 









Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
M. Akhand 
Department of Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
J. E. Hobbs 
Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
W. A. Kerr 








Funding for this project was provided by the Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness 
Research Network (CATPRN) which is funded by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. The views in paper are 




The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) which was signed into law in January, 2011 
represents a major initiative to improve food safety in the US. The legislation mandates the US 
Food and Drug Administration with developing a regulatory system to implement the Act. As 
yet, the full effect of the Act cannot be evaluated because the regulatory requirements are yet to 
be developed. There is little doubt, however, that those firms, both domestic and foreign, that 
wish to supply US consumers with food will face a considerable increase in regulatory costs. 
This paper outlines the major requirements of the FSMA and suggests how the regulatory burden 
may fall on foreign versus US domestic suppliers. Areas where Canadian firms may be 
disadvantaged relative to US firms are outlined. Opportunities that may arise from the FSMA for 
Canadian agri-food firms are discussed, as are the areas where the FSMA may not conform with 
the international trade commitments of the United States.     
 
 







The United States Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Food Safety Modernization 
Act (FSMA), signed by President Barak Obama, on 4
th January 2011, has been touted as the 
most significant update of US food safety laws since the 1930s. The FSMA mandates the FDA to  
protect the American public against food-borne diseases and illness. The spur for a stronger  
regulatory regime for food safety arose from high-profile outbreaks of food-borne illness that 
shook public confidence in the US food supply over the last few years. For instance, evidence of 
E. coli and Salmonella have been found in domestic and imported foods including spices, peanut 
butter, cookie dough, spinach, melons, hot peppers, tomatoes and green onions. The new 
regulations focus on better arming the FDA to protect consumers against food-borne problems 
associated with domestic and imported food.  Imports became a particular concern after widely 
publicised problems with food imported from China in 2007 (Liu et al., 2009). The US imports 
food from over 150 countries, and there is a widely held perception that the food-safety standards 
of many countries from which imports are sourced are weak or that enforcement is lax. Imported 
food constitutes 15 percent of the US food supply, including 80 percent of the seafood and 
approximately 60 percent of the fresh produce that is consumed (Superville and Jalonick, 2011). 
The FSMA focuses on preventing food related problems rather than mitigating them. The Act 
covers about 80 percent of all food consumed within the US, with the exception of meat, poultry 
and dairy, which is regulated separately by the U.S Department of Agriculture. The Bill also 
includes exemptions for small food companies and farms. 
 
Governments have the obligation and the right to take actions to protect their citizens 
from harm – including those that may arise from food consumption. A failure in the food safety 
system can be one of the most politically damaging events for policy makers. It does not matter 
whether the failure originated within the domestic market or outside the country, domestic 
politicians are likely held accountable by their citizens. As a result, ensuring the safety of the 
food supply is an area of policy making where sovereignty is closely guarded (Kerr and Hobbs, 
2010).  Given improved detection technologies and changing risk environments, periodic 
changes to food safety regulatory regimes can be expected. Regulatory changes are likely to 
increase the costs for firms involved in food supply chains. If those cost increases fall 
disproportionately upon some participants in agri-food supply chains their competitiveness can 
be expected to deteriorate. The commitments made under the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), however, 
stipulates that changes in regulations should not impose costs in such a way that they 
disadvantage foreign producers relative to domestic producers (Isaac, 2007). Thus, increases in 
costs that apply equally to US and foreign firms should not adversely affect competitiveness. 
Further, internationally, even if all foreign firms are treated the same, the ability of firms and 
supply chains to adapt to the new requirements may differ so that the relative competitiveness of 
some country’s firms will improve while other’s deteriorate. 
 
The US is by far Canada’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately three 
quarters of Canada’s exports and two thirds of imports in 2009 (Statistics Canada, n.d.). The US 
is also Canada’s largest agricultural export market, constituting approximately 51.4 percent of 
export market share in agri-food and seafood products in 2009 (AAFC, n.d). Similarly, Canada is 
the largest market for U.S agricultural goods. About 6,000 truckloads of fresh produce from the  
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US are delivered to Canadian grocery stores every day (CBC, n.d.). Hence, it may well be that 
the FSMA could adversely affect the competitiveness of US-origin supply chains in the 
Canadian market; and or Canadian-origin supply chains in the US market. 
. 
The interaction between regulation and international competitiveness in relation to food 
safety is complex. Many of the increased costs relate to monitoring activities and are often 
subsumed in the general administrative costs of a firm – and thus cannot easily be identified 
(Hobbs and Young, 2000). They represent calls on the time of individuals. Bottlenecks may 
materialize in the process of meeting a new standard – lack of certified facilities, delays in 
regulators putting in place sufficient staff to undertake new aspects of their regulatory oversight, 
the need to train staff in testing laboratories, etc. These bottlenecks can be temporary transitional 
impediments to competitiveness or ongoing constraints that negatively affect trade flows. They 
are open to political interference through the budgetary process and, hence, are susceptible to 
capture by those who seek economic protection. In many cases it is not yet possible to fully 
assess the FSMA’s effect on competitiveness because the administrative details have yet to be 
worked out by the FDA. Thus, all that can be done here is to point out potential areas where 
bottlenecks may exist in the future and/or where the application of the FSMA are likely to violate 
WTO commitments. 
 
2.0  The US Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 
 
The FMSA became law in January 2011 but there will be a considerable grace period as 
the FDA and other US regulatory agencies must develop new protocols and procedures, train 
staff and inform both domestic and foreign-origin food supply chain participants what 
compliance will entail. Under the new US$1.4 billion bill, the FDA will have new prevention-
focused tools and a clear regulatory framework to help make substantial improvements in their 
approach to food safety (FDA, n.d.).
 The following are the key policy changes in the new FSMA 
that may have potential implications for those trading foodstuffs into or out of the US. It should 
be remembered that the FSMA does not regulate meat, poultry and dairy products.  Alcoholic 
beverages, dietary supplements, and seafood are, however, now covered in the Act.  
 
  The foreign supplier verification program: The FDA has been given the power to require 
import certification for imports that attests that the food was produced in compliance with US 
laws and regulations. US importers will be required to verify the activities of their foreign 
suppliers, ensuring their suppliers produce foods that comply with: 1) hazard analysis and 
preventative controls (HACCP); or, 2) with production and harvesting standards. A foreign 
supplier must also provide assurances that their products are not adulterated or misbranded. 
The FDA will provide new regulations by the end of 2011 to define the required verification 
methods. The FDA will determine requirements based on the known risks associated with the 
food or its geographic origin. Food without proper foreign supplier verification and 
importing food without a verification program in place may result in import prohibitions or 
criminal prosecution. Food production facilities must inform the FDA, in writing, of all 
identified hazardous practices that exist along their supply chains and their plans to 
implement preventive measures. The FDA, along with the Department of Homeland Security 
and Department of Agriculture, will issue regulations that prevent food companies from 
knowingly including illegal additives, chemicals or other substances in their food products.  
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  Mandatory food recalls: The FMSA gives the FDA the power to directly order a mandatory 
food recall or to seize and detain food if there is a reasonable probability that the product is 
adulterated or misbranded and could cause serious adverse health consequences. Previously, 
recalls were voluntary with the decision lying with the firm. It is hoped that the threat of 
FDA action will induce more firms to undertake voluntary recalls expeditiously. 
 
  Shut down of production: The FMSA gives the FDA the ability to temporarily shut down a 
food production facility if a possible health risk is suspected. The FDA is granted expanded 
access to food production facility records. It may formally request access to a firm’s records 
if there is reason to suspect a potential public health risk or for tracking purposes.     
 
  The frequency of inspection: The frequency of inspections by the FDA will increase. Those 
facilities designated as ‘High Risk’ must be inspected every three years. Those designated as 
being ‘Low Risk’ must be inspected within seven years of the passage of the FMSA. Both 
foreign and domestic facilities must be inspected. In 2011, the FDA is mandated to inspect 
no fewer than 600 foreign facilities and inspections of foreign food facilities must double 
each year for the next five years. When fully implemented, inspection of foreign facilities 
must take place twice a year. Further, in an effort to improve food safety oversight, FDA 
offices must be established in at least five foreign countries that export food to the US. The 
FDA will have the authority to review the current food safety practices of countries that wish 
to supply the US market. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is tasked with 
working with foreign governments to streamline the inspection of foreign facilities.   
 
  Standards for on-farm production and harvesting: Nationwide science-based mandatory 
standards for producing and harvesting fresh produce will be established by the FDA. 
Further, for some specified vegetables and fruits as well as produce which are designated as 
being ‘High Risk’  designated raw agricultural commodities   the FDA will publish safety 
guidelines. The Act also requires the FDA to identify the most significant food threats  
food-borne contaminants and diseases  every two years.  
 
  Post-harvest supply chains: Specific response and recovery procedures will be developed to 
deal with outbreaks of food-borne illness by Health and Human Services, in consultation 
with the Department of Homeland Security. Grocery stores will have frontline responsible 
for pro-actively alerting customers regarding product recalls.  
 
  Effective traceability: In coordination with the fruit and vegetable industries, the FDA will 
create a new method of effectively tracking and tracing fresh produce.  
 
  Laboratory accreditation: By early 2013, the FDA must develop a mechanism to accredit 
laboratories for the purposes of food safety testing. The mechanism is to have model 
standards that include sampling and analytical procedures, internal quality controls and 
training for individuals carrying out the collection of a sample and subsequent analysis. The 
goal is to increase the number of laboratories that qualify. Foreign laboratories are eligible 
for participation if they achieve the model standards. Laboratories will be required to be 
accredited to conduct any regulatory testing by mid-2013.  
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  Third-party auditors: The FSMA requires that the FDA establish a means to recognize 
accreditation bodies and third-party auditors. Third-parties can be a foreign government, a 
private firm or a non-government organization (NGO). Third-party audit certifications will 
be used to ensure that an imported product complies with US laws and regulations. 
 
  Mandatory registration: A new twice yearly registration procedure will be put in place and 
firms in the food industry must attain compliance with updated requirements or risk 
suspension. Food facility registrations will need to be renewed every two years. The FDA 
will have the ability to suspend a registration meaning that no one would be able to import 
food into the US from such facility. A suspended US facility would not be able to export. 
 
  Agriculture and food products transportation: Regulations regarding sanitary practices in 
transportation must be developed by the FDA. Shippers, carriers by motor vehicle or rail 
vehicle, receivers, and other persons engaged in transportation of food will be required to 
implement the practices. 
 
  Pre-screening to expedite imports: The FDA will provide a voluntary qualified importer 
program for firms desiring expedited import procedures for food. Importing firms   
participating in this program are required to have certifications from an accredited third-party 
auditor. High risk foods or foods from high risk countries, at FDA’s discretion, may have 
additional requirements specified.   
 
  The burden of costs and incentives: The FDA may collect fees to offset importer re-
inspection related costs and for administering the qualified importer program. Firms that 
require re-inspection or recall may be subject to a fee established by the FDA. 
 
The regulation exempts small producers from recordkeeping and hazard analysis 
requirements. Small scale producers are defined to cover a category of producers who sell 
directly to distributors and whose annual sales are less than US$500,000. This exemption may be 
revoked if, in the future, food related problems are linked to small scale producers (Superville 
and Jalonick, 2011). 
 
3.0  Implications for the Competitiveness of the Canadian Agri-food Sector 
 
It is not possible to provide a complete assessment of the effect of the FSMA on the 
competitiveness of the Canadian agrifood sector because full implementation will only be 
achieved over the next two or three years – and this is assuming the FDA can actually achieve 
the targets for the development of systems, procedures and trained personnel set out in the 
legislation. The latter cannot be assumed – for example, it took years for the much less ambitious 
and simpler US country of origin labelling (COOL) of imported food to be fully implemented 
(Sawka and Kerr, 2010). Much of what ultimately effects Canadian competitiveness will arise 
from the future regulations developed by the FDA and other US government agencies. Still, the 
main areas where Canadian competiveness could be affected can be identified. Canadian agri-
food firms need to remain vigilant as the full extent of the new US regulatory environment 
pertaining to food safety unfolds.   
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Exporters of agri-food produce and products to the US and U.S domestic importers will 
be subject to much closer scrutiny of their food safety controls under the new FSMA. This 
applies equally to all foreign suppliers of the US. The legislation has raised the bar for entry of 
agri-food products into the US by imposing additional minimum requirements. Importers are 
now accountable for food safety due to the new importer verification requirements and this, in 
turn, implies that Canadian agri-food exporters will have to be directly responsible for the safety 
of their products. As with their US counterparts, Canadian agri-food exporters will have to 
comply with registration requirements, increased US FDA requests for access to records, 
undertake hazard analysis, implement preventive controls and performance standards, put in 
place product tracking systems and engage in increased recordkeeping activities. Mitigation 
strategies for intentional adulteration must be developed by firms. All these can raise the cost of 
exporting to US and foreign supplier verification can deter U.S importers from sourcing in 
Canada if the process of obtaining a verification certificate is costly, lengthy and complex. While 
costs will undoubtedly rise, they will also rise for US firms. It may well be that Canadian firms 
may be more able than firms from other nations, particularly firms located in developing 
countries, in meeting US standards. As a result, despite the increase in costs, Canadian exporters 
of some products might have a competitive advantage over competing exporters in the US 
market and see trade expand. 
 
A preliminary impact assessment of the FSMA by Thompson and Rutherford (2009) 
found that all participating groups of Canadian agri-food exporters identified the ‘hazard analysis 
and preventive controls’ and ‘traceability measures’ as areas of concern. Grains, oilseeds and 
pulse exporters, processed food and horticulture exporter groups particularly identified 
‘certification and accreditation’ measures as areas they considered problematic. Further 
clarification on the ‘performance standards’ measure was also sought by these groups. A 
horticulture exporter group noted that depending on the acceptance of current Canadian industry 
practices, the standards established by the FDA for production of fresh produce and other raw 
agricultural products could be a potential problem. 
 
The FDA will henceforth require imported food to be certified to ensure compliance with 
U.S. laws. This will require exporting firms to identify the appropriate US laws and then to make 
the changes necessary to come into compliance. Subsequently, certification will have to be 
arranged. If the firm fails to obtain certification, exports may be disrupted until the problem is 
identified and rectified. Entry into the U.S. may be delayed until certification is obtained. 
Certification may be delayed due to a shortage of certifiers. In case of perishable products, such 
as fresh fruits and vegetables, a delay in obtaining certification can lead to deterioration in the 
quality of the products awaiting export. The FDA will provide regulations regarding how a firm 
can verify that food has not been adulterated or misbranded. In this case, the exporting industry 
may incur additional cost if they have to install equipment for verification of food safety, such as 
equipment for testing for contamination or chemical residues. The industry will also need to 
provide training to employees or hire skilled workers to undertake verification and testing 
procedures. If products have to be transported to some other place for testing, then additional 
transportation costs will be incurred. 
 
The legislation requires the FDA to develop a program for accrediting testing laboratories 
within two years of its passing. Given the wide ranging increase in monitoring embedded in the  
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FSMA there is likely to be an increased demand for food safety related testing. Existing 
laboratories in Canada will have to expand and investments in new laboratories likely warranted. 
This is a clear area for potential bottlenecks. Certification will involve both evaluation of 
laboratory infrastructure and the training of laboratory staff. Investments in expanded and new 
laboratories will have to await the release of the new FDA accreditation program and what the 
process will entail. Similarly, the training/upgrading of staff skills will have to await the release 
of the FDA accreditation standards. What is not clear is how the ability to export will be affected 
in the time between the date of the FDA establishing a program and the time it takes to comply. 
Accreditation will take time, particularly if facilities have to be upgraded or staff retrained. 
Putting in place an accreditation program itself will require either evaluation by FDA personnel 
or the development of third party certification institutions. FDA personnel are likely to be 
stretched by the demand for certification leading to queuing delays. Alternatively, the 
establishment of a third party system will require the development of a regulatory regime to 
oversee that industry. It is not clear whether Canadian firms will be able to export while 
constraints on the accreditation of laboratories exist. Further, those laboratories that manage to 
garner accreditation early in the process may be able to extract rents in terms of testing fees 
while laboratory capacity constraints exist. Thus, a great deal of uncertainty exists for Canadian 
agri-food exporters. 
 
A similar problem relates to the establishment of a third party audit system. The intent of  
the new audit system is to ensure that all parties in food supply chains are conforming to US 
laws. It is not clear how onerous such audits will be for firms along the supply chains. The costs 
involved could be substantial. In any case, this will be a major undertaking and require the 
expansion of existing accredited third party auditing firms and/or the establishment and 
accreditation of new third party audit firms. Again, there is considerable potential for bottlenecks 
to develop. Until the FDA program is rolled out, a full evaluation is not possible. 
 
This auditing of firms for compliance with US laws and regulations all along the supply 
chain may provide an incentive for transaction cost reducing vertical integration – a reduction in 
monitoring costs through a reduced number of audits (Hobbs and Kerr, 1992). Even if full 
vertical integration is not the result, the requirement for auditing may work to the detriment of 
small Canadian firms that may be excluded from audited supply chains given the fixed costs of 
auditing. 
 
Canadian exporting firms must also register with the FDA. Registrations will have to be 
renewed twice a year. This requirement may work against intermittent or opportunistic exporters 
that currently exploit international market arbitrage rather than engaging in sustained exporting. 
As they cannot predict when arbitrage opportunities will arise they may choose not to 
consistently register. Similar requirements that arose from post-9/11 Homeland Security 
initiatives, however, may not have been particularly onerous (Kerr, 2004).  
 
The FSMA mandates the use of US recognized HACCP by foreign firms. While HACCP 
is widely used in Canada, there is no international harmonization of HACCP systems (Kerr, 
2000). If the FDA insists on the use of HACCP systems that comply with US standards, 
Canadian firms may have to alter their practices, or be forced to simultaneously use a Canadian 
system and a US system. Resources constraint issues may again come to the fore as there will be  
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the need for US recognized HACCP trainers and certifiers which currently do not exist in 
Canada. Further, a system for certification and audit of the HACCP systems used by Canadian 
exporting firms will have to be established.  
 
The FSMA requires traceability of imported food products. For many industries, and 
particularly for fresh produce, where inputs are sourced from many suppliers, maintaining the 
complete information on the place of origin and supply chain movements of a product and 
linking a products history with its eventual distribution is a daunting task. Canada’s official 
traceability initiative is centred on livestock and meat, while some other industries are putting 
traceability systems in place. The US has been a laggard in traceability initiatives (Brocklebank 
et al., 2008). While traceability is simple in concept – and thus politically popular – it is difficult 
and costly in practice. In the European Union where traceability has been officially promoted, 
and to some extent mandated, the efficacy of the systems put in place have not proved 
particularly robust. Thus, mandating traceability in the FSMA may prove to be operationally 
problematic with considerable costs lumbered onto both US domestic industries and international 
suppliers. One can expect considerable ‘push back’ from the domestic industry in the US if the 
post-BSE  bovine spongiform encephalopathy  experience with the US beef industry is at all 
representative. If there is a softening of the traceability requirement, Canada should be vigilant 
that such changes are not made in ways that disadvantage foreign suppliers. The study by 
Thompson and Rutherford (2009) found that a group identified as importers/exporters viewed the 
proposed FSMA traceability measures as very problematic and unlikely to enhance food safety. 
 
It is not clear whether the FDA’s mandate to require recall of products can extend to 
foreign suppliers. At the very least, suspect foreign products will now be open to seizure and 
detention. Given the provisions for mandatory registration, foreign suppliers that did not comply 
with a FDA mandatory recall would likely quickly have its registration cancelled effectively 
ending its ability to export. Hence, one is likely to observe compliance with recall requests.  
 
The inspection of foreign facilities mandated in the FSMA is an enormous task given the 
number of countries that currently supply food products to the US and the complexity of 
international supply chains. All foreign facilities are to be inspected every two years. As yet, 
there is no indication who will be undertaking the inspections. Whether it is FDA personnel or 
third parties that will undertake the inspections, it will require a large number of trained 
inspectors. Inspections add new facets to exporting including inconsistency among inspectors, 
opportunities for corruption and political interference in the rigour with which inspections are 
undertaken. Inspections were a contentious issue in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement 
negotiations (Bruce and Kerr, 1986; Kerr, et al., 1986). The expansion of US inspections into the 
NAFTA marketplace would seem to represent a potential backward step in North American 
market integration.  
 
The FSMA gives the right to the FDA to shut down a facility if it suspects a food safety 
risk. Beyond the questions raised regarding the legitimacy of extraterritoriality, this is not a 
particularly contentious issue. The contentious issue may become, however, under what 
circumstances will a facility be able to begin exporting to the US again. Those charged with 
protecting the market from unsafe food have little interest in when exports can actually resume. 
The recent Canadian experience with the ability of US-based interest groups to delay the re- 
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opening of the US border in the wake of the discovery of BSE in Canada and the subsequent 
border closure provides a powerful lesson (Loppacher and Kerr, 2005). 
 
The FDA will establish production and harvesting standards for fresh produce. 
Agronomic conditions vary greatly and can be localized to a considerable degree. Thus, 
standards established for US conditions may not be optimal for production and harvesting in all 
circumstances. As a result, exports may be denied market access or compliance costs may be 
higher for foreign suppliers. Again, establishing such standards for a wide variety of products 
will require a considerable resource commitment by the FDA – and the possibility of delays. 
 
The requirements for transporting food may require investments in new trucks and other 
shipping related facilities. While this may represent a considerable expense for Canadian firms, 
the same costs will be borne by US firms given the integrated nature of the North American 
market. To reach the new transportation standards may be much more difficult for suppliers from 
developing countries given the generally poor state of infrastructure in many of those countries. 
As a result, Canadian exporters may find that they have gained a competitive advantage. 
 
In general, the FSMA sets out a very ambitious agenda for the FDA under very short 
timelines. While it is hard to judge if the resources made available to the FDA will be sufficient 
for it to undertake what it has been charged with, it will require considerable numbers of trained 
and relatively specialized people. There is unlikely a pool of such individuals for the FDA to 
draw upon so compromises will have to be made either on the quality of the people 
implementing the program or in the timelines.  Less than fully trained people will be more prone 
to make mistakes – mistakes that will be costly for exporting firms. Delays in implementation 
play havoc with the investment that will have to be made to continue to access the US market. 
As yet, the full effect of the FSMA for Canadian competitiveness is far from transparent. 
Canadian firms that wish to export to the US will have to be vigilant as there will be a host of 
FDA regulations that will be rolling out over the next few years. 
 
4.0  The FSMA and International Trade Commitments 
 
The FSMA provisions fall under the commitments that the US has made under the 
WTO’s SPS agreement. Central to those commitments is the Principle of Non-discrimination. 
There are two elements of Non-discrimination – Most Favoured Nation and National Treatment. 
National Treatment is what is applicable in the case of the FSMA. National Treatment commits a 
country not to impose SPS-based regulations that treat foreign suppliers differently than 
domestic suppliers. The FSMA would appear to violate US National Treatment provisions in a 
number of ways. 
 
The requirement that foreign facilities be inspected twice a year when ‘High Risk’ 
facilities in the US are only inspected once every three years and US ‘Low Risk’ facilities will be 
inspected within seven years is clearly discriminatory. There is an egocentric presumption that 
foreign facilities are riskier than US facilities. Given that inspections will likely impose 
considerable costs, this provision endows US producers with a competitive advantage over 
foreign suppliers. Countries can impose higher standards if there is scientific evidence or 
evidence of an increased risk. It is unlikely that the US could prove that foreign facilities  
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represent a greater food safety risk than domestic facilities to the satisfaction of a WTO Disputes 
Panel. This provision could be challenged at the WTO. 
 
A potential source of inconsistency of the regulation with WTO rules is the exemption 
of small scale producers from HACCP requirements. This exemption has not been extended to 
foreign suppliers. From a food safety perspective, this exemption is hard to understand. 
Scientifically, there is no evidence attributing food-borne complications to large scale supply 
chains or imported products. It does recognize the disproportionate burden HACCP and 
traceability would place on small agri-food companies and farms. That the exemption has not 
been extended to foreign suppliers could be challenged as a violation of National Treatment at 
the WTO. The exemption in the US is, however, only for firms supplying locally (however 
defined). Hence, the trade effects on Canadian exporters may be small.   
 
As the FDA sets out its regulations, there may be other areas where National Treatment 
is violated. In particular, the requirements for inspection, certification, tracing and auditing 
should be monitored carefully for requirements that are stricter for foreign suppliers than 
domestic firms. The FDA is also allowed to impose fees to recover the costs of inspections, etc. 
These fees could be charged in ways that could discriminate against foreign suppliers. 
 
The FDA is to develop production and harvesting standards for fresh produce. If foreign 
firms are judged to not be complying with these standards, they will not be allowed to export to 
the US. Trade barriers are not allowed to be put in place on the basis of production and 
processing methods (PPMs). If Canadian food meets scientifically-based food safety 
requirements, they should not be excluded from the US market based on the production or 
harvesting methods used.  Mandating the use of US HACCP standards might also be considered 
a PPM. 
 
Under the provisions of the NAFTA, Canada and Mexico are supposed to be consulted 
when there is a major regulatory change (McLachlan et al., 1988). One wonders to what degree 
Canadian (and Mexican) authorities have been consulted regarding the FSMA and how much 
they will be consulted by the FDA as it develops its implementing regulations. Unfortunately, as 
with a number of the regulatory cooperation and coordination aspects of the NAFTA, one 





The FSMA represents a major attempt at strengthening the safety of food consumed by 
US consumers. While one might question the efficacy of the changes in delivering greater food 
safety, the intent is clear. What is not clear, as yet, is what regulatory compliance will cost. It 
would appear that it will be a considerable burden for supply chains in the food industry. Both 
domestic and foreign firms will have to bear that cost if they wish to continue to supply the US 
food market.  
 
The effects on competiveness is a relative concept. If costs were borne equally by all 
suppliers of food to the US market there would be no change in competitiveness. If the burden  
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falls unequally, this will lead to changes in competitiveness. If costs fall unequally on foreign 
suppliers then they will lose markets to US suppliers. Except in a few cases – inspections and 
small scale producers – as yet there is little evidence of overt discrimination against foreign 
suppliers. It is, however, early days as the FDA must develop a host of new regulations 
pertaining to the FSMA. These must be assessed as to whether they discriminate in favour of US 
supply chains. 
 
Even if costs rise, competitiveness may improve if Canadian firms can more easily 
comply with the FSMA than other foreign suppliers. Some provisions of the FMSA are likely to 
prove to be very onerous for supply chains originating in developing countries, much more 
onerous than for their Canadian competitors. Thus, Canadian firms should be on the lookout for 
these types of opportunities. 
 
It is also clear that the costs of the FSMA will fall on all US firms – except for those 
receiving exemptions due to their small size. Firms exporting from the US will thus be lumbered 
with the costs of complying with the FSMA. Import competing Canadian firms will not incur 
these costs. Thus, the competitiveness of US exporters should decrease. Canadian firms should 
be able to capitalize on this opportunity and increase their market shares. 
 
The FSMA appears to be a major undertaking with a very large responsibility placed on 
the FDA. It would seem that bottlenecks to exporting are bound to appear which will be very 
frustrating for Canadian firms. It is important for Canadian firms and the Canadian government 
to work hard to ensure that temporary bottlenecks do not become permanent inhibitors of trade. 
Private industry should avail themselves of any opportunities provided by the FDA to have input 
into the implementation of the FSMA. The Canadian government should consult with Canadian 
industry to understand their concerns and use any mechanisms – including those in the NAFTA – 
to undertake formal and informal consultations with the US.  
 
Given the likely lags in implementation, North American food markets will be beset by 
considerable uncertainty and some turmoil over the near term. Trade flows will be affected. As 
the implementation programs of the FSMA become less opaque, more sophisticated analysis into 
its effect on Canadian competitiveness in the US market should be undertaken.   
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